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1 Introduction
Middlemen, trading entrepreneurs who link the backwaters of developing countries to emerging
markets nationally and especially globally, seem to be universally reviled despite the economic
service they provide. Without their capital and specialized knowledge, high prices in growing
markets might be outside the reach of the small holder in the rural area, or of the home-based
artisan in the urban slum. By bridging this gap, albeit for profit, surely they help to alleviate
poverty?
And yet it is this profit motive, and the claim that these middlemen make “excessive
profits” because of market power, that is at the root of much of the concern. Thus, for example,
McMillan, Welch and Rodrik (2004) study the case of cashews in Mozambique, and report that
cashew growers only receive 40 to 50 percent of the border price, even after border taxes are
allowed for. They go on to note:
“it is clear that the marketing channels for raw cashew nuts remain imperfectly
competitive. Farmers’ incomes are depressed not only by transport and marketing
costs, but also by the market power exercised by the traders.” (p 120).
The role of middlemen and market power in determining price pass throughs has been widely
commented upon.1 Middlemen and their profits attract particular attention in remote areas,
where rural households arguably bear a double burden: high transport costs, and the market
power of middlemen (Goetz 1992, and Sexton, Kling and Carmen 1991). These extra margins,
it would seem, render it all the more unlikely that households in dispersed agriculture, for
example, can reap the full benefits of globalization (Nicita 2004, Hertel and Winters 2005).
Remoteness of location and the market power of middlemen, it is thus suggested, are closely
related.
Many social movements in developing countries address themselves to providing an al-
ternative channel to the market for poor producers. For example, the Self Employed Women’s
Association (SEWA) India has set up the SEWA Trade Facilitation Service (STFC):
“...the artisan women though skilled in hand embroidery had to forcibly migrate in
1See for example Arndt et. al (2000), Hertel and Winters (2005), and Pokkrel and Thapa (2007).
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search of work, or undertake earth digging work. The trade of their old valuable
embroidered trouso would typically occur during distressed time. This would occur
with traders and middlemen since the artisans had access to a very limited market...
Lack of market information hindered artisans from building a strong relationship
with the buyers. With the inception of STFC, integrated supply chain mechanism
was created and the production became organized.”
(http://www.sewatfc.org/sewa_information.php?page_link=background)
Some not-for-profit organizations, in the “fair trade” business, promise a number of
outcomes, including an improved outcome for the impoverished producers of the products
being sold. Here is how this is accomplished according to the Fair Trade Federation:
“...fair traders typically work directly with artisans and farmers, cutting out the
middle men who increase the price at each level - enabling retail products to remain
competitively priced in respect to their conventional counterparts, while more fairly
compensating producers.”
(http://www.fairtradefederation.org/ht/display/Faqs/faqcat_id/1737)
One interpretation of the above claim is that the fair trade organization essentially divides up
the excessive profit of the middlemen between the producer and the consumer. However, in
many cases fair trade products sell for a premium compared to identical products but without
the fair trade label. Moreover, in many cases such “non-profits” receive direct support, from
governments and other donors, to carry out their mission of being middlemen but without the
(excessive) profits, helping to get more of the market price into poor producers’ pockets (DFID
2009).2
The juxtaposition of middlemen trading for profit and non-profits with other objectives
raises interesting and important analytical and policy issues. Analytically, what does an equi-
librium with middlemen and non-profits look like? How precisely do the price mark up as well
as the price pass through, from market price to producer price, differ in the equilibrium with
2See DFID (2009, pp. 44 - 45.) for example, for one of the most recent government commitments to support
fair trade through direct investment and procurements.
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middlemen and non-profits compared to the equilibrium with only middlemen? What precisely
is the impact of non-profits on poverty when the full round of market repercussions, including
entry and exit of middlemen and of non-profits, is taken into account? Should a government
interested in poverty reduction subsidize the entry of non-profits, or should it perhaps subsidize
the entry of middlemen? Should wealthy consumers in the North pay a premium for fair trade
products, or would the same amount of money be better used to subsidize fair trade non-profits
directly?
These are the questions to which this paper is directed, and they are questions to which
we believe the literature provides only a partial answer. Indeed, the literature has yet to deliver
a theory of endogenous price markups and variable price pass throughs in a spatial equilibrium
where middlemen and non-profits co-exist with free entry and exit. The development of such
a model is the first task of this paper. We begin with a framework in which middlemen
market power interacts with producer location to co-determine the degree of imperfect price
transmission.3 Match friction a` la Mortensen (2003) due to farmers’ imperfect knowledge
about prices constitute the reason for middlemen market power in our setup. Equilibrium is
characterized by price dispersion among otherwise identical producers. We thus depart from
the multi-tiered marginalization approach used for example in McMillan, Welch and Rodrik
(2004), and consider instead a setting that can accommodate heterogeneity in the distribution
of the export surpluses between middlemen and producers within a given region. In addition,
we also depart from the familiar match friction setting by introducing a spatial dimension to
the model. This allows us to examine how the nature of price dispersion, and the implied
degree of price transmission imperfection, vary with location.
Our findings are largely consistent with the empirical observations already stated. At
each location, middlemen market power implies an endogenous division of export surplus be-
tween producers and the middlemen. Across locations and accounting for producers operating
in increasingly remote areas, middlemen market power intensifies. This endogenous variation
in middlemen market power across location further dictates the extent of imperfect price trans-
3There is also a literature on the theory of middlemen as market intermediaries (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky
1987). The emphasis of our work differs from this earlier literature in that we are interested in the role of
non-profit middlemen in influencing the distribution of the gains from trade, and how this distribution varies
endogenously along a spatial continuum.
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mission. Indeed, we find that producers in more remote locations are more susceptible to an
unequal division of the size of the export surplus.4
Within this setting, we introduce non-profits motivated by a concern for poverty either
on behalf of the final consumers they serve via a price premium, or the preferences of the non-
profits themselves.5 These non-profits act as an alternative intermediary other than traditional
middlemen linking the world market and individual producers.6 Their concern for poverty will
be expressed in the form of a warm glow effect, which takes effect whenever the non-profit
operates in locations where poverty is known to be pervasive. In our setup with match friction
and spatial differentiation, we examine how the entry of non-profit middlemen impacts the
distribution of producer prices for any given location, as well as how the impact of non-profits
is differentially felt across locations. In doing so, we provide answers to the questions posed
above on the impact of non-profits on price pass-through and on poverty. This framework
also allows us to address the questions on policy, specifically, on what if anything should a
government, or rich consumers, subsidize if the ultimate objective is poverty reduction.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the framework and equilibrium
with middlemen only. Section 3 introduces non-profits and characterizes equilibrium when
both types of intermediaries can enter. Section 4 takes up the policy questions – who exactly
should the government subsidize and what exactly should consumers interested in “fair trade”
subsidize? Section 5 concludes.
4These results also distinguish our setting from Gersovitz (1989), where the issue of agricultural taxation
with spatial dispersion is analyzed in the the absence of (for-profit) middlemen market power.
5There is a longstanding literature on mixed oligopolies, in which welfare-maximizing public firms compete
with profit maximizing firms (Merrill and Schneider 1966, Harris and Wiens 1980). Most of these models
entertain Cournot competition (Matsushima and Matsushima 2003), and Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1991)
works with product differentiation in a Hotelling model. Our emphasis here is different in that non-profits are
neither profit maximizing, nor do they maximize social welfare. To our knowledge, our treatment based on
match friction has likewise not been emphasized in the literature.
6From an altogether different perspective, Bardhan, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2007) also study the issue
of middlemen margin in a model of outsourcing. Unlike our work, moral hazard and the importance of quality
form the motivation for the existence of middlemen in their paper (Biglaiser and Friedman 1994).
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2 The Model and Equilibrium with Middlemen
2.1 The Basic Setup
We consider a spatially dispersed economy, in which production takes place at a range of
distances x ∈ [x, x¯] away from a transport hub. At each location x there is a large number
of identical producers, N . Each producer has a unit of output for sale either domestically or
as exports. Any output bound for exports must be transported to the hub. For each unit
exported, let p∗ be the unit border price, and p ≤ p∗ the producer price. Output not bound
for exports can be used for own-consumption or sold domestically. In either case, the revenue
equivalent of any output not exported is c, with 0 ≤ c < p∗.
2.2 Middlemen: The Bertrand Benchmark
Transportation is carried out by middlemen, who incur a location-specific transportation cost
tx per unit output.7 If free entry and frictionless Bertrand price competition prevail among
middlemen, the equilibrium producer price p∗− tx is strictly location-specific at each x, as long
as p∗ − tx is greater than the reservation value c. All middlemen thus earn zero profit: they
sell output at price p∗ at the hub, after having incurred tx as transportation cost, and p∗ − tx
as payment to producers. This simple framework yields a stark set of predictions regarding the
volume of total export, the distribution of income between middlemen and producers, as well
as the incidence of poverty among producers.
In terms of export volume, all producers located at x ≤ (p∗−c)/t ≡ x+o devote all output
to exports. In what follows, we assume that x < x+o , and as such there exist at least some
locations where exports generates strictly positive surplus p∗ − tx − c > 0. To furthermore
accommodate the possibility of incomplete coverage and location as a binding constraint on
exports for at least some producers, we assume in addition that x¯ ≥ x+o .
The producer price implications of Bertrand competition are likewise straightforward.
There is perfect one-to-one pass through of the net border price (p∗− tx) to producers, and the
full export surplus (p∗ − tx − c) at each location x, appropriately accounting for opportunity
cost c, is captured by the producer. Consequently, inequality in the distribution of revenue
7A Samuelson iceberg type transportation cost can similarly be imposed, by assuming for example that
t = τp∗, τ > 0, without affecting the qualitative implications of the model.
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among producers is a strictly inter-regional phenomenon. At any given location x ≤ x+o , all
producers earn identically p∗ − tx. Across locations, producer price is decreasing in x. For
x > x+o , border price p
∗ is insufficient to cover the full cost tx + c, and producers receive the
domestic value c per unit.
To examine the poverty implications of export, let p¯ denote the minimal producer price
required to sustain private consumption at a level no less than an exogenously given poverty
line. We are particularly interested in situations where production alone without the possibility
of export is not sufficient to stage an escape from poverty, or p¯ > c.8 With Bertrand competition
among middlemen, poverty incidence as measured by the share of producers living under the
poverty line is thus discontinuous along the locational continuum: for x ≤ (p∗ − p¯)/t ≡ xpo(<
x+o ), no one is poor, but immediately thereafter, every producer is poor.
In summary, there are two critical threshold locations, xpo and x
+
o . For x ≤ xpo, export
completely eradicates poverty. For x ∈ (xpo, x+o ), unit export revenue lies strictly between
c and the poverty line p¯. Producers at locations even more distant than x+o from the hub
have effectively no access to export markets. Figure 1 summarizes, and shows the equilibrium
producer price along the location continuum.
2.3 Middlemen with Market Power
We depart now from the Bertrand assumption, where every producer is perfectly aware of each
and every middlemen price offer, and consider instead an arguably more realistic scenario in
which there is match friction between producers and middlemen (Mortensen 2003). Specifically,
at every location x, each of an endogenous number (Mx) of middlemen first chooses a price
offer from the range of feasible prices, p ≥ c. Let Fx(p) be the cumulative distribution function
of such offers at location x. The middleman proposes an offer to one of the N producers chosen
at random. Each producer ranks any and all offers received this way, accepts the highest offer,
and rejects the rest.
Match friction arises whenever producers are not aware of the full set of price offers.
Indeed, let the likelihood that a producer comes across z = 0, 1, 2, ... offers be given by a Poisson
8If p¯ < c instead, poverty is a non-issue since all producers can live above the poverty line by simply selling
their products domestically at c.
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distribution with parameter λx = Mx/N , or, Pr(z; λx) = e−λxλzx/z!.9 Since the distribution of
each such price offer is Fx(p), the cumulative distribution of the maximal offer received is:
Hx(p) ≡
∞∑
z=0
e−λxλzxFx(p)z
z!
= e−λx(1−Fx(p)). (1)
Middlemen are fully cognizant of and can thus take advantage of the existence of match friction.
Expected middlemen profit accordingly embodies the middlemen margin p∗−tx−p conditional
on the price offer p, as well as the likelihood that p out-competes all other offers received by
the producer, Hx(p):
Πx = max
p≥c
Hx(p)(p∗ − tx− p)−K (2)
where K ≥ 0 is a fixed cost per producer contacted. Expected middlemen profit maximization
implies the following equilibrium price offer distribution:
Fx(p) =
1
λx
ln
(
p∗ − tx− c
p∗ − tx− p
)
, fx(p) =
1
λx(p∗ − tx− p) . (3)
Naturally, Fx(c) = 0 for no producer will accept a price offer less than the domestic (reservation)
value c. Meanwhile, the highest price offer given across all middlemen p+x at location x can be
found by setting Fx(p+x ) = 1, or equivalently:
p+x = (1− e−λx)(p∗ − tx) + e−λxc, (4)
a weighted average of the net border price (p∗ − tx), and the domestic value (c). The relative
weights depend only on the extent of middlemen market power, as given by the ratio λx =
Mx/N . As λx → ∞, Fx(p) puts unit mass on limλx→∞ p+x = p∗ − tx. In contrast, as λx → 0,
p+x tends to the domestic price c.
In addition to the price offer distribution Fx(p), middlemen market power λx has an
important bearing also on the realized distribution of producer prices. Whenever λx > 0,
Hx(p) = e−λx(1−Fx(p)) =
e−λx(p∗ − tx− c)
p∗ − tx− p . (5)
where Hx(c) = e−λx gives the fraction of producers who are left out of export markets, and
Hx(p)−Hx(c) the fraction for whom output is bound for exports, and who fetch a price at p
9As is well-known, the Poisson distribution is the limit of the binomial distribution with parameter λx as the
number of trials approaches infinity.
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or less from their middlemen. With the distribution of realized producer prices from (5), it can
be easily seen that all middlemen in fact earn identical expected profits anywhere along the
domain p ∈ [c, p+x ]:
Hx(p)(p∗ − tx− p)−K = e−λx(p∗ − tx− c)−K
= Hx(c)(p∗ − tx− c)−K.
To ascertain entry incentives, therefore, it suffices to consider one such price, say c. Endogenous
entry implies
e−λx(p∗ − tx− c) = K (6)
whenever there is positive number of middlemen Mx = λxN > 0. It follows therefore that in
equilibrium,10
λx = Mx/N = max{ln((p∗ − tx− c)/K), 0}
Hx(p) = max{ K
p∗ − tx− p, 0}. (7)
From (6) and (7), equilibrium middlemen market power λx is determined by the interplay
between entry cost K, and the export surplus p∗− tx− c. Evaluated at the market determined
λxN = Mx, any expected increase in export surplus with one additional middleman, Hx(c)(p∗−
tx − c), is equated to the cost of doing so, K. Thus, equilibrium middlemen entry is in fact
constrained efficient given match friction and positive entry costs.11
As a special case, consider the case of cost free entry K = 0. From (7), middlemen market
power vanishes (λx →∞), and the Bertrand outcome prevails. More generally for K > 0, the
ratio λx = Mx/N increases with border price p∗ reflecting more intense competition among
middlemen, and decreases with distance x reflecting instead a deepening of middlemen power
along the location continuum. In the end, with positive entry cost, export is positive only in the
range x ≤ (p∗−c−K)/t ≡ x+. In comparison with the Bertrand outcome, x+o = (p∗−c)/t > x+,
middlemen market power robs producers in locations (x+, x+o ] their access to export markets.
10The associated maximal price offer is thus p+x = max{p∗ − tx−K, c}.
11It can be readily verified that λx as displayed in (6) maximizes total producer and middlemen revenue net
of entry cost at each location N [(p∗ − tx)(1−Hx(c)) + cHx(c)− λxK].
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2.4 Producer Price of Exports and Pass Through
Apart from endogenous middlemen market power, match friction additionally gives rise to
endogenous producer price of exports, depending on location. At any given location with
positive export, average producer revenue conditional on receiving at least one acceptable offer
(Epx) is a weighted average of the net border price (p∗ − tx) and the domestic value c:
Epx ≡
∫ p+x
c
pdHx(p)
1−Hx(c) = (1− γx)(p
∗ − tx) + γxc < p∗ − tx. (8)
where γx ≡ λxe−λx/(1− e−λx). Since p∗− tx− c represents net surplus available from exports,
the share that goes, on average, to middlemen is thus:
p∗ − tx− Epx
p∗ − tx− c = γx ≡
λxe
−λx
1− e−λx
γx thus captures the extent of unequal division of the export surplus between middlemen and
producers. Evidently, this division depends systematically on middlemen market power λx,
and as such the division of surplus varies endogenously along the locational continuum. From
(7), it is straightforward to confirm that γx rises with distance for middlemen market power
strengthens with distance. Producers at farther away locations are accordingly left with a
smaller slice of the export surplus.
Using (6) and (7), the average producer price of exports with endogenous entry can now
be expressed as:
Epx = p∗ − tx−K ln(p
∗ − tx− c
K
)
p∗ − tx− c
p∗ − tx− c−K . (9)
Thus, a mark up – p∗ − tx− Epx > 0 – prevail whenever entry cost is strictly positive K > 0.
The size of this markup, accounting for endogenous entry, is strictly increasing in the net border
price p∗− tx.12 Intuitively, a higher net border price encourages entry (λx) and simultaneously
12To see the intuition here, note that whereas Nλx = Mx number of middlemen enter at cost K in equilibrium,
and the number of middlemen with positive average markup gross of fixed cost (p∗ − tx−Epx) is equal only to
the number of producers with positive sales N(1−Hx(c)) = N(1− e−λx). The rest Nλx −N(1− e−λx) fail to
strike a successful match despite having incurred the fixed cost K, for their price offers are outbid by that of
other middlemen. Equation (9) essentially requires that with endogenous entry,
p∗ − tx− Epx = K
(
λx
1− e−λx
)
⇔ NλxK = N(1− e−λx)(p∗ − tx− Epx).
Thus, the equilibrium size of the markup p∗ − tx − K − Epx is just high enough to justify the entry of the
marginal middlemen, accounting fully for the possibility of negative profits at −K subsequent to entry in case
of a failure to match.
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increases the number of middlemen who fail to strike a successful match Nλx−N(1− e−λx) as
they are outbid by other middlemen. To justify this risk, the mark up p∗ − tx−Epx for those
who succeed in striking a match must also rise in tandem.
Turning now to the issue of pass through of border price to the average local producer,
what role does distance play? Specifically, the average revenue of all producers at x can be
expressed simply as the weighted average:
ERx = (1−Hx(c))Epx +Hx(c)c = p∗ − tx− (1 + λx)K. (10)
where λx = ln(p∗ − tx − c) − lnK from (4). The extent of border price pass through can be
ascertained by evaluating the responsiveness:
∂ERx
∂(p∗ − tx) = 1−
K
p∗ − tx− c = 1− e
−λx < 1. (11)
Thus, the revenue of the average producer at location x rises less than one for one with net
border price. But even more important, the extent of this imperfect pass through worsens
endogenously with distance from (7), all the way up until the point is reached where x ≥ x+o
and thus λx = 0. Producers located here and beyond are by definition untouched by forces of
export markets. Figure 2 illustrates, and shows the range of middlemen price offer [c, p+x ] at
each location, as well as the average revenue of all local producers along the location continuum.
2.5 Intra- and Inter-regional Poverty
With price dispersion both within region through Hx(p), and across regions as Hx(p) varies
with x, the incidence of poverty has both an intra- and an inter-regional dimension. These
are shown in Figure 3, for three successively more remote regions (from H1 to Hp and then to
H2), and accordingly three producer price distributions that can be rank ordered in the sense
of first order stochastic dominance.
To have a direct gauge on poverty, respectively define Pmx,α and P
c
x,α as the poverty of
producers who gain access to export markets through middlemen, and the poverty of all other
producers at location x. We adopt the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty indicator:
Pmx,α =
∫ min{p¯,p+x }
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α dHx(p)
1−Hx(c) ≤
(
p¯− c
p¯
)α
= P cx,α (12)
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where (p¯−p)/p¯ is the poverty gap ratio, and α ≥ 0 parameterizes the extent of poverty aversion.
Naturally, overall poverty at location x can be expressed as:
Px,α = (1−Hx(c))Pmx,α +Hx(c)P cx,α. (13)
As shown, of the two groups of producers living under the poverty line: (i) Hx(c) = e−λx are
poor because they fail to export and (ii) Hx(min{p¯, p+x })−Hx(c) = e−λx(min{p¯, p+x }−c)/(p∗−
tx −min{p¯, p+x }) remain poor despite export. Between the two, producers who fail to export
are poorer since P cx,α ≥ Pmx,α whenever α ≥ 0.
As long as some producers are non-poor, or p+x > p¯, a small increase in the border price
p∗, all else equal, alleviates both these sources of poverty. Furthermore, heightened competition
between middlemen (an increase in λx) brings relief to both Hx(c) and Hx(p¯)−Hx(c). In the
limit, as λx → ∞ or as K → 0 approaching the Bertrand outcome, the first source of poverty
Hx(c) vanishes with the disappearance of match friction as long as the net border price p∗− tx
exceeds the poverty line p¯, while the measure of the second Hx(p¯)−Hx(c) likewise approaches
zero, since no middlemen can offer less than the full p∗−tx and get away with it without match
friction.
Inter-regional differences in poverty arise for two reasons in our setup. First, remote
locations are naturally disadvantaged for the net border price (p∗ − tx) is lower there. But
second, remote locations are in fact made doubly worse off for middlemen market power also
deepens along the locational continuum from (7). Taken together, poverty worsens with dis-
tance, and indeed from (13), the poverty indicator can be re-expressed to reflect directly the
impact of location on poverty:
Px,α =
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp.
for locations where there are at least some producers who are non-poor. The threshold distance,
call it xp, beyond which producers are universally living below the poverty line is reached when
the maximal price offer p+x can no longer cover p¯, or equivalently min{p¯, p+x } = p+x . From (4)
and (7),
x ≥ xp ≡
(
p∗ − p¯− e−λx(p∗ − tx− c)
)
/t = (p∗ − p¯−K)/t (14)
≤ p
∗ − p¯
t
= xpo.
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Consequently, middlemen market power deepens the incidence of poverty along both the in-
tensive (Px,α > 0) and extensive (xp < xpo) margins (Figure 2). For x > x
p, all producers are
poor, and thus,
Px,α =
α
p¯
∫ p+x
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp+
(
p¯− p+x
p¯
)α
and Px,α continues to worsen with distance x (say from Hp to H3 in Figure 3). Henceforth, we
assume that xp exceeds at least the lower bound x, in order to examine the set of factors that
effect changes along the extensive margin.
We have so far demonstrated location as a key determinant of middlemen market power.
In addition, we have demonstrated the implications of such a link in terms of mark ups and pass
through, as well as intra-and inter-regional poverty. In this context, how does the introduction
of non-profits impact middlemen market power along the locational continuum? And what
about the related issues of mark up and pass through, as well as intra- and inter-regional
poverty?
3 Non-profits
Like profit-maximizing middlemen, we henceforth incorporate non-profits who similarly serve
producers by bringing output to export markets at transportation cost tx. But unlike profit-
maximizing middlemen, they are additionally motivated by the location-specific implications
of middlemen market power both on poverty as well as on prices.
We incorporate these concerns by a location specific price premium pnx − p∗ > 0, where
pnx is the valuation put by the non-profit on purchase of output at location x. Our restriction
on pnx − p∗ is mild, and our objective is simply to capture a concern for producers in locations
otherwise characterized by high mark ups and / or isolation from world markets. Specifically,
we assume pnx − p∗ = ax where a ≥ 0 captures the overall strength of the poverty and pricing
concerns of the non-profit. In what follows, we further assume that the dependence of the price
premium on x is not overly strong, so that the net border price accounting for transportation
costs, tx, continues to indicate remoteness as a deterrence to exports, or equivalently pnx− tx =
p∗ − (t − a)x is decreasing in x.13 The (money equivalent) gains to a non-profit who serves a
13The linearity of the price premium in x assumed here can be easily relaxed to accommodate any monoton-
12
producer located at x, and offers producer price p, is thus also location-specific
pnx − tx− p = p∗ + ax− tx− p.
As will be seen below, this simple modification gives rise to a rich array of possible
implications. But first in terms of interpretation, the price premium can be thought of as the
money equivalent utility gains to a non-profit simply by virtue of serving faraway producers,
who previously saw a large part of the export surplus captured by middlemen. Alternatively,
a non-profit middleman can also be thought of as but another profit maximizing middleman,
who has access to foreign consumer demand that embodies a concern for location, via a revised
schedule of border prices pnx = p
∗ + ax.
We take the fixed cost applicable to non-profits Kn to be strictly greater than K, in
order to account for any non-profits’ cost disadvantage relative to longstanding middlemen,
and other non-trivial costs of monitoring and certification to justify the final consumer price
premium.14
3.1 Equilibrium with Middlemen and Non-Profits
Denote Fnx (p), p ≥ c, as the cumulative distribution of price offers inclusive of both non-
profits and middlemen. In analogous fashion as when there are only middlemen, let Hnx (p) =
e−λnx(1−Fnx (p)) be the cumulative distribution of the realized producer price distribution, where
λnx is now the ratio (m
n
x+M
n
x )/N , and m
n
x and M
n
x respectively denote the endogenous number
of non-profits and middlemen.
The problem of a non-profit is otherwise similar to that of a middlemen: they account
for the net (price premium augmented) gains from serving a producer (pnx − tx− p), adjusted
appropriately to reflect the likelihood of successfully striking a match, Hnx (p), in the face of
competing price offers from other middlemen:
pinx = maxp H
n
x (p)(p
n
x − tx− p)−Kn (15)
Πnx = maxp H
n
x (p)(p
∗ − tx− p)−K. (16)
ically increasing function a(x) without affecting the results to follow, as long as tx − ax is increasing in x and
distance continues to deter export.
14The opposite scenario where Kn < K can be easily inferred from the analysis to follow.
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Since the premium adjusted gains from a match is higher for a non-profit pnx−tx−p > p∗−tx−p
for any given price offer, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium range of non-profit
price offers, if non-empty, is always higher than that of profit-maximizing middlemen.15 Put
another way, the entry of non-profits effectively confines profit maximizing middlemen to service
producers who are not matched with non-profits.
Accordingly, let pˆx be an endogenous price offer threshold, dividing the range of middle-
men and non-profit price offers. Fnx (pˆx) thus gives the share of price offers from private profit
maximizing middlemen (Mnx /(m
n
x +M
n
x )), and 1−Fnx (pˆx) the share from non-profits. For any
p ≤ pˆx, (15) implies
Fnx (p) =
1
λnx
ln
(
p∗ − tx− c
p∗ − tx− p
)
(17)
and otherwise with p > pˆx for non-profits, (15) and (16) give
Fnx (p) = F
n
x (pˆx) +
1
λnx
ln
(
pnx − tx− pˆx
pnx − tx− p
)
. (18)
The threshold pˆx is determined via (17) as soon as the share of middlemen at location x, Fnx (pˆ),
is known. This important share is endogenized here by way of simultaneous endogenous entry
of profit maximizing middlemen and non-profits respectively:
e−λ
n
x (p∗ − tx− c) = e−λnx(1−Fnx (pˆx))(p∗ − tx− pˆx) = K, (19)
e−λ
n
x(1−Fnx (pˆx))(pnx − tx− pˆx) = e−λ
n
x(1−Fnx (p))(pnx − tx− p) = Kn (20)
where the marginal non-profit λnx(1− Fn(pˆx)) = mnx/N equates the price premium augmented
expected export surplus e−λnx(1−Fnx (pˆx))(pnx − tx − pˆx) and the cost of entry Kn from (20),
and the marginal middlemen λnx = (m
n
x + M
n
x )/N then equates the expected export surplus
(e−λx(p∗−tx−c)) with the cost of entryK from (19). Thus for interior solutions Fnx (pˆx) ∈ (0, 1),
the threshold price offer dividing middlemen and non-profits is:
pˆx = p∗ − tx− axk1− k (21)
15To see this, suppose that p˜n and p˜ are solutions to (15) and (16) respectively. By virtue of profit maximiza-
tion, it must be the case that
pnx − tx− p˜n
pnx − tx− p˜ ≥
Hnx (p˜)
Hnx (p˜n)
≥ p
∗ − tx− p˜n
p∗ − tx− p˜ ,
with
ax ≥ 0,
it follows that p˜n ≥ p˜.
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where k denotes the ratio of fixed costs K/Kn < 1. Clearly, the higher the price premium ax,
the narrower the range of middlemen price offers [c, pˆx]. Meanwhile, the greater the non-profit’s
(fixed) cost disadvantage Kn/K = 1/k, the higher the middlemen’s maximal price offer. These
show interestingly the tendency for middlemen to optimally charge a higher mark up on average
to producers they continue to serve, the higher the non-profits’ price premium. At the other
end of the price offer spectrum, the maximal non-profit price offer is given by:
pn+x = p
∗ + ax− tx−Kn (22)
from (20) evaluated at Fnx (p
+
x ) = 1. The larger the price premium, the higher of course will be
the maximal non-profit offer in equilibrium.
Finally, from (19) and (20), the number of non-profits (mnx) and the number of middlemen
(Mnx ) at an interior equilibrium are respectively,
16
mnx = Nλ
n
x(1− Fnx (pˆx)) = N ln(
ax
Kn −K ) (23)
Mnx +m
n
x = Nλ
n
x = N ln(
p∗ − tx− c
K
). (24)
3.2 Producer Price of Exports and Pass Through
Depending on the price premium, fixed costs, as well as the export surplus, it follows from (23)
and (24) that there are three possible equilibrium configurations, respectively when there exist
only middlemen, only non-profits, and when the two coexist:
Proposition 1 Upon introducing non-profits with price premium a ≥ t(Kn−K)/(p∗−c−K),
producers are served
1. entirely by middlemen at locations closest to the hub x < (Kn −K)/a
2. by a mix of both middlemen and non-profits, for x ∈ [(Kn−K)/a, (Kn−K)(p∗−c)/(Ka+
(Kn −K)t))
16Such an allocation is once again constrained efficient in the presence of match friction and costly entry, in
the sense that national welfare, as measured by the sum of expected producer revenue, expected middlemen and
non-profit gains from servicing producers at entry cost K and Kn, N [(pnx− tx)(1−Hnx (pˆx))+(p∗− tx)(Hnx (pˆx)−
Hnx (c)) + cH
n
x (c) − λnxK − λnx(1 − Fnx (pˆx))(Kn −K)], can be shown to be maximized exactly by choice of mnx
and Mnx as shown in (19) and (20).
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3. entirely by non-profits, for x ∈ [(Kn−K)(p∗−c)/(Ka+(Kn−K)t), (p∗−c−Kn)/(t−a)].
Producers at even farther away locations are not served by either middlemen or non-profits.
In what follow, we discuss each of these cases in detail.
3.2.1 No Non-Profits, Only Middlemen
With no non-profits in equilibrium, mnx = 0. From (23), this occurs whenever:
a ≤ K
n −K
x
≡ a1(x). (25)
or equivalently, whenever non-profits fail to out-compete middlemen thanks to a price premium
too small to cover the added fixed cost Kn−K. Naturally, this occurs at locations sufficiently
close to the hub where the price premium is the lowest, since:17
a ≤ a1(x) ⇔ x ≤ K
n −K
a
≡ x1(a).
Region I of Figure 4 illustrates all (x, a) combinations consistent with this equilibrium. Here,
the distribution of realized prices are unaffected by the entry of non-profits (H1 in Figure 5).
Consequently, the average price of exports, the responsiveness of average producer revenue to
world price changes, along with intra-regional poverty, all remain untouched by the possibility
of non-profit entry.
3.2.2 No Middlemen, Only Non-Profits
At the other extreme, there are no middlemen, Mnx = 0, or from (23) and (24), the price
premium is sufficiently high:
p∗ − tx− c ≤ p∗ − tx− pˆx ⇔ a ≥ K
n −K
K
p∗ − tx− c
x
≡ a2(x). (26)
In locational terms, a no-middlemen equilibrium applies at distant locations:
a ≥ a2(x) ⇔ x ≥ (K
n −K)(p∗ − c)
Ka+ (Kn −K)t ≡ x
2(a).
17The range of equilibrium price offers with non-empty support ([c, (1− e−λnx )(p∗ − tx) + e−λnx c]) remains the
same as before, while middlemen market power continues to be given by (λnx =
Mnx
N
= max{ln(p∗ − tx − c) −
lnK, 0} = Mx
N
).
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Note in addition that locations too distant x ≥ (p∗ − c − Kn)/(t − a) ≡ xn+(a) are beyond
the reach of even non-profits, since the premium adjusted border price p∗ + ax is too small
to cover costs (tx + Kn + c). These two restrictions are illustrated in Figure 4 by region III
including all combinations of (x, a) bounded respectively to the left and right by schedules
x2(a) and xn+(a). As shown, region III can be further divided into two parts. The first
part x ∈ [x2(a), x+) represents all locations wherein non-profits take over and middlemen are
completely displaced. The second include all other locations where non-profits now serve as
brand new links to export markets where previously none existed.
What difference do non-profits make? We demonstrate in what follows (i) a level effect
on the average producer price of exports, and (ii) a pass through effect on the responsiveness
of local producer revenue to world price changes. To see the first, the maximal price offer by a
non-profit is at
pn+x = p
∗ + ax− tx−Kn. (27)
from (20). pn+ is thus greater than the corresponding maximal middlemen price offer p+ =
p∗ − tx − K since x in [x2(a), x+) must be greater than x1(a), or, ax > Kn − K from (25).
Furthermore, the equilibrium non-profit to producer ratio is
λnx =
mnx
N
= max{ln(p∗ + ax− tx− c)− lnKn, 0} (28)
from (20). This is likewise strictly greater than the middlemen to producer ratio λx =
max{ln(p∗ − tx− c)− lnK, 0} in the absence of non-profits.
Finally, from (20), the equilibrium realized price distribution accounting for endogenous
entry is simply (H4 in Figure 5):
Hnx (p) =
Kn
p∗ + ax− tx− p (29)
which lies uniformly below Hx(p) = K/(p∗− tx−p) in the absence of non-profits provided that
x > x2(a). Each of these observations reinforce one another, and together they imply a higher
average producer price of exports with non-profits:18
Enpx =
∫ pn+
c
p
1−Hnx (c)
dHnx (p) = p
∗ + ax− tx− λ
n
xK
n
1− e−λnx
≥ Epx ≥ c. (30)
18The proof of inequality (30) is relegated to the Appendix.
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as well as a higher overall average producer revenue across all producers
EnRx = (1−Hnx (c))Enpx +Hnx (c)c ≥ ERx. (31)
Furthermore, with a higher prevalence of non-profits to producer than middlemen to producers
(λnx > λx ≥ 0) from (28):
∂EnRx
∂p∗ − tx = 1− e
−λnx > 1− e−λx = ∂ERx
∂p∗ − tx. (32)
Evidently, the entry of non-profits improves the responsiveness of local producer revenue to
border price changes as well.
3.2.3 Co-existence
Turning finally to the case wheremnx > 0 andM
n
x > 0, non-profits and private profit maximizing
middlemen coexist when a is in the intermediate range, a ∈ (a1(x), a2(x)) for fixed location x,
or equivalently, x ∈ (x1(a), x2(a)) for fixed a. Region II in Figure 4 illustrates the intermediate
locations, and price premium combinations consistent with this range.
With co-existence, the direct impact of non-profit entry on private middlemen can be
seen in two regards. The first concerns entry. From (10) and (11), we note that interestingly,
λnx =
mnx +M
n
x
N
= ln(p∗ − tx− c)− ln(K) = Mx
N
= λx.
All else constant, therefore, the entry of one more non-profit has the effect of directly displacing
a middleman. The second concerns pricing. The revised realized producer price distribution
accounting for λnx above is piece-wise continuous, with
Hnx (p) =
K
p∗ − tx− p = Hx(p) if p ≤ pˆx
=
Kn
pn − tx− p ≤ Hx(p) otherwise.
so that the cumulative Hnx (p) remains strictly unchanged in the range of middlemen prices
p ≤ pˆx, but the fraction of producers receiving higher prices in the non-profit range increases
with the entry of non-profits. Price distribution schedules H2, H¯ and H3 in Figure 5 illustrate.
Naturally, the entry of non-profits raises the implied average price of export:
Enpx =
∫ pˆx
c
p
1−Hnx (c)
d
K
p∗ − tx− p +
∫ pn+
pˆx
p
1−Hnx (c)
d
Kn
p∗ + ax− tx− p
= Epx + ax
(1− (1 +mnx/N)e−m
n
x/N )
1− e(mnx+Mnx )/N > Epx
18
whenever mnx > 0. Similarly, the implied average local producer revenue
EnRx = (1−Hnx (c))Enpx +Hnx (c)c
= ERx + ax(1− (1 +mnx/N)e−m
n
x/N ) > ERx
also exceeds ERx. By contrast, however, note from (23) that since the equilibrium number of
non-profits depends strictly on the price premium ax relative to the increment in entry cost
Kn −K, it follows that
∂EnRx
∂p∗ − tx =
∂ERx
∂p∗ − tx
and thus the extent of imperfect pass through remains unchanged despite the entry of non-
profits as long as middlemen market power λnx remains unchanged at λx.
In summary, Region I in Figure 4 exhibits invariance despite the possibility of non-profit
entry. Producers in these locations are too close to the hub and accordingly the price premium
is to low to justify the entry of non-profits. Region II presents the intermediate range where
middlemen and non-profits co-exist. As discussed, overall producer revenue rises thanks to
the entry of non-profits, but the degree of border price pass through remains untouched. The
final region III encompasses locations where non-profit completely displace middlemen, and
locations where non-profit facilitated export where isolation from world markets was the norm.
At these locations, both overall producer revenue, and the extent of border price pass through
improve with non-profits. Figure 4 reveals additionally that regions II and III are non-empty
as long as the price premium is large enough to guarantee that non-profits are viable at least
at x+ – the least remote distance without competition from middlemen – or ax+ ≥ (Kn−K),
equivalently a ≥ t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c−K). It follows that
Proposition 2 At the national level, averaging across all locations x ∈ [x, x¯], the introduction
of non-profits with price premium a ≥ t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c−K)
1. gives rise to a first order stochastically dominating shift in the producer price distribution
as Hnx (p) ≤ Hx(p) for all x,
2. raises the average producer price of exports since Enpx ≥ Epx for all x, and
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3. improves the responsiveness of average local producer revenue, inclusive of exporting and
non-exporting producers, to border price changes since ∂EnRx/∂(p∗−tx) ≥ ∂ERx/∂(p∗−
tx) for all x.
3.3 Intra- and Inter-regional Poverty Incidence
The poverty implications of non-profits are illustrated in Figure 5, in which a family of producer
price distributions is shown going from distances nearest to the hub, to more remote locations
deeper into the hinterland. Of particular interest is the cutoff distribution H¯. For locations
closer to the hub relative to H¯, the poor are served by middlemen only, and non-profits offer a
price higher than the poverty line p¯, or
pˆ ≥ p¯ ⇔ x ≤ p
∗ − p¯
t+ ak/(1− k) ≡ x¯
n(a). (33)
Since the poor remains untouched by non-profits, the introduction of non-profits at these
locations naturally leave poverty unchanged at:
Pnx,α =
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp = Px,α.
By contrast, for locations further into the hinterland than H¯, either some (for x ∈
[x¯n(a), x2(a)), or all of the poor (x ∈ [x2(a), xn+(a))) will be served by non-profits. At all
locations where there are at least some non-poor, p¯ ≤ pn+, poverty declines with the entry of
non-profits:
Pnx,α =
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1
Hnx (p)dp
≤ α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1
Hx(p)dp. = Px,α
which follows since Hnx (p) first order stochastically dominate Hx(p) from Proposition 1. In the
appendix, we discuss all of the remaining cases, depending on (i) whether all producers are
poor, and (ii) whether middlemen and non-profits co-exist. But in all:
Proposition 3 At the national level, averaging across all locations x ∈ [x, x¯], the introduction
of non-profits
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1. reduces overall average poverty (Pnx,α ≤ Px,α) for all x if a ≥ t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c −K),
and remains unchanged otherwise,
2. pushes back towards the hinterland the threshold location beyond which all producers are
poor if in addition a ≥ t(Kn−K)/(p∗− p¯−K); otherwise the threshold location remains
unchanged.
To see the second part of the proposition, note that the maximal non-profit price offer
p∗ + ax− tx−Kn from (27) is below the poverty line
x ≥ p
∗ − p¯−Kn
t− a ≡ x
np(a) ≥ xp = p
∗ − p¯−K
t
(34)
if and only if a ≥ t(Kn−K)/(p∗− p¯−K) as stated based on (14). With the help of (33) - (34),
Figure 6 illustrates the full array of possibilities in our model of middlemen and non-profits.
Depending on the size of the premium a, there are two main classes of outcomes.19 The first
class involves a at relatively low levels, between t(Kn−K)/(p∗− c−K) and t(Kn−K)/(p∗−
p¯ − K). In this range of price premia, non-profit can emerge and do so in regions IIn,allpoorm,allpoor
where they co-exist with middlemen, and IIIn,allpoor where non-profits only serve as producers’
link to export markets. Importantly, with price premia this low, in no location are non-profits
able to price above the poverty line.
The second class of cases involves relatively high price premia a ≥ t(Kn−K)/(p∗−p¯−K).
For each a in this range, there are as many as five distinctive equilibrium middlemen-nonprofit
configurations, depending on whether middlemen and non-profits coexist (regions I, II or III),
and whether at least some of the producers served are non-poor. Interestingly, therefore, at a
given price premium, a, the mean poverty of producers served by non-profits across all locations:
Pnα =
∫ x2(a)
x1(a)
∫min{p¯,pn+x }
pˆx
[(p¯− p)/p¯]αdHnx (p)dx+
∫ xn+(a)
x2(a)
∫min{p¯,pn+x }
c [(p¯− p)/p¯]αdHnx (p)dx∫ x2(a)
x1(a) 1−Hnx (pˆx)dx+
∫ xn+(a)
x2(a) 1−Hnx (c)dx
(35)
may well be higher or lower than the mean poverty of producers served by middlemen:
Pmα =
∫ x1(a)
x
∫min{p¯,p+x }
c [(p¯− p)/p¯]αdHnx (p)dx+
∫ x2(a)
x1(a)
∫min{p¯,pˆx}
c [(p¯− p)/p¯]αdHnx (p)dx∫ x1(a)
x 1−Hnx (c)dx+
∫ x2(a)
x1(a) H
n
x (pˆx)−Hnx (c)dx
(36)
19An additional class has a smaller than t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c−K) and as shown in Figure 5, a is too small for
non-profit to ever emerge in equilibrium.
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since there are regions (say IIn,allpoorm,allpoor) where non-profits offer strictly higher prices compared
to middlemen in the same location, but there are also locations (say, IIIn,allpoor) where some
non-profits offer strictly lower prices compared to middlemen in other locations (say, region
In,somepoor). These can be contrasted against the average poverty of producers who continue
to have no access to export markets,
P cα =
∫ x¯
x [(p¯− c)/p¯]αHnx (c)dx∫ x¯
x H
n
x (c)dx
=
(
p¯− c
p¯
)α
. (37)
In what follows, we offer an observation comparing the three.
Lemma 1 For all a ≥ t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c−K) where either middlemen, non-profits, or both
can emerge in equilibrium depending on location, poverty among non-exporting producers is the
greatest but the poverty ranking between producers served by middlemen and non-profits is in
general ambiguous:
P cα ≥ max{Pmα , Pnα }.
In the special case of poverty head count with α = 0, and price premia in the range a ∈
[t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c−K), t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − p¯−K)]
1 = P c0 = P
n
0 > P
m
0
all non-exporting producers and all producers served by non-profits are poor, but some producers
served by middlemen are not.
There are two opposing forces at work here. With a price premium, non-profits do indeed
offer higher prices (Propositions 2 and 3). But with poverty aversion, non-profits tend to work
in remote locations where producers are poorer (Proposition 1). Consequently, the relative
poverty of producers served by middlemen and non-profits is indeed ambiguous. As we will
see, however, this particular ranking turns out to be key in the determination of poverty
reducing strategies.
4 Policy for Poverty Reduction
We have by now seen the full range of possibilities in the absence of government interventions, in
terms of the equilibrium share of middlemen and non-profits, the impact of non-profits on mark
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up and pass through, as well as the equilibrium poverty implication of non-profits. We now
address a final set of questions: Should a government interested in poverty reduction subsidize
non-profits, or should it perhaps subsidize middlemen? And should consumers interested in
poverty reduction pay a premium on purchases from a non-profit, or should they subsidize the
fixed costs of the non-profits?
4.1 What Should Government Subsidize?
With three groups of producers served respectively by middlemen, non-profits, and no interme-
diaries at all, there are three corresponding direct mechanisms of intervention: (i) a subsidy on
exports mediated by middlemen sm; (ii) a subsidy on exports mediated by non-profits sn, and
(iii) a subsidy on products for domestic sales sc, or equivalently, a price support guarantee for
all producers who do not export. The first option effectively raises the border price for mid-
dlemen from p∗ to p∗ + sm. The second option effectively raises the premium adjusted border
price facing non-profits from pn to pnx + s
n. The final option raises producers’ opportunity cost
of exports from c to c+ sc. The revised expected profits of non-profits and middlemen are:
pinx = maxp H
n
x (p)(p
n
x + s
n − tx− p)−Kn,
Πnx = maxp H
n
x (p)(p
∗ + sm − tx− p)−K.
Since the opportunity cost of export facing producers is now c+ sc in the presence of domestic
price support, the minimum price offer from any middlemen must now be c+ sc. Like before,
let pˆx be the price offer threshold separating non-profits and middlemen, the distribution of
middlemen price offers p ≤ pˆx , accounting for the three subsidies is:
Fnx (p) =
1
λnx
ln
(
p∗ + sm − tx− c− sc
p∗ + sm − tx− p
)
. (38)
Thus, an increase in sm shifts the price offer distribution via a first order stochastically dom-
inating change, reflecting an on average higher offer from middlemen to producers. Likewise,
an increase in sc has a similar effect, literally since the minimum offer rises in tandem with sc.
Now for non-profit price offers with p > pˆx,
Fnx (p) = F
n
x (pˆx) +
1
λnx
ln
(
pnx + s
n − tx− pˆx
pnx + sn − tx− p
)
, (39)
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and as such an increase in the subsidy sn shifts the price offer distribution again via a first
order stochastically dominating change, raising the average non-profit price offer even further.
Each of these observations are important from a distributional standpoint, since the poverty
head count Hnx (p¯) ultimately depends on the price offer distribution F
n
x (p) :
Hnx (p) = e
−λnx(1−Fnx (p)).
Now, the threshold price offer pˆx separating middlemen and non-profits is determined once
again obtained by observing that with simultaneous and endogenous entry of profit maximizing
middlemen and non-profits:
e−λ
n
x (p∗ + sm − tx− c− sc) = e−λnx(1−Fnx (pˆx))(p∗ + sm − tx− pˆx) = K, (40)
e−λ
n
x(1−Fnx (pˆx))(pnx + s
n − tx− pˆx) = e−λnx(1−Fnx (p))(pnx + sn − tx− p) = Kn (41)
and thus for interior solutions where Fnx (pˆx) ∈ (0, 1) where middlemen and non-profits co-exist:
pˆx = p∗ − tx− (ax+ s
n)k
1− k +
sm
1− k
mnx
N
= λnx(1− Fnx (pˆx)) = ln
(
ax+ sn − sm
Kn −K
)
Mnx +m
n
x
N
= λnx = ln
(
p∗ − tx− c+ sm − sc
K
)
. (42)
Evidently, any difference in sn − sm > 0, reflecting policy discrimination favoring non-profits,
directly impacts non-profit entry and thus the equilibrium number of non-profits mnx. Mean-
while, any difference in sm−sc, will directly impact middlemen entry, and thus the equilibrium
number of middlemen, at constant sn − sm.
For any given price premium a > t(Kn −K)/(p∗ + sm − c− sc −K) in Figure 6 so that
non-profits emerge in some locations,20 let βm, and βn denote the share of producers served by
middlemen and non-profits respectively, across all locations:
βm =
∫ x1(a)
x 1−Hnx (c)dx+
∫ x2(a)
x1(a) H
n
x (pˆx)−Hnx (c)dx
x¯− x ,
βn =
∫ x2(a)
x1(a) 1−Hnx (pˆx)dx+
∫ xn+(a)
x2(a) 1−Hnx (c)dx
x¯− x .
20Figure 6 shows equilibrium configuration when all three subsidies are evaluated at zero.
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We can now express overall poverty, accounting for all locations, as:
Pα = βmPmα + β
nPnα + (1− βm − βn)P cα,
and the budget cost B¯ of the three subsidies as:
B¯m + B¯n + B¯c = [βmsm + βnsn + (1− βm − βn)sc](x¯− x)N (43)
where B¯i = siβi(x¯ − x)N , i = m,n, c. Consider therefore a small increase in subsidy budget
B¯n directly towards subsidizing non-profits, snβn(x¯ − x)N . In the appendix, we show that
starting from sn = 0, the marginal impact of a small increase in the non-profit subsidy budget
on total poverty Pα:
∂Pα
∂B¯n
= − α
p¯N(x¯− x)P
n
α−1 (44)
is proportional to the poverty indicator Pnα−1 among producers served by non-profits. This
echoes Besley and Kanbur (1988), where the national poverty impact (Pα) of a regional food
subsidy is shown to highest by targeting a region with the highest Pα−1. This very insight
continues to hold despite several key difference between setups: the prevalence of both intra-
and inter-regional heterogeneity in producer income here, and the fact that middlemen, non-
profits, or both, can and do partake in the income gains made possible by the corresponding
subsidy program because of imperfect pass through.
In similar fashion, the marginal impact of a middlemen subsidy, and a domestic price
support are respectively given by:
∂Pα
∂B¯m
= − αP
m
α−1
p¯N(x¯− x) and
∂Pα
∂B¯c
= − αP
c
α−1
p¯N(x¯− x) .
From Lemma 1, we know that the relative ranking of Pmα−1, and Pnα−1 is in general ambiguous
for any given price premia, and thus the relative ranking of the marginal impacts of a non-profit
subsidy and a middlemen subsidy is accordingly ambiguous. But for the special case of α = 1,
we know from Lemma 1 that in fact 1 = P c0 = P
n
0 > P
m
0 based on the poverty head count, we
have thus:
Proposition 4 The marginal impacts of respectively a small increase in sn, sm, and sc on the
overall poverty gap ratio P1 can be ranked as follows:∣∣∣∣ ∂P1∂B¯c
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∂P1∂B¯n
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣ ∂P1∂B¯m
∣∣∣∣
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if the price premium is in the range a ∈ [t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − c−K), t(Kn −K)/(p∗ − p¯−K)].
Interestingly, and intuitively, with an objective to minimize overall poverty (P1) at α = 1,
one way to maximize the marginal impact of the subsidy program (44) is to target non-profits,
if the price premium a is small and in fact all producers served by non-profits are living below
the poverty line. Alternatively, the marginal impact of a domestic price support is similar
in magnitude, because producers who do not have access to export markets are likewise poor
across the board.
4.2 What Should Consumers Subsidize?
In this final section, we investigate whether subsidizing production via a price premium pnx > p
is a sensible strategy for consumers interested in raising the welfare of producers at large. A
natural candidate to compare with is a subsidy on non-profit entry. Thus, let Sa and Sk
represent respectively subsidies to supplement the non-profit premium from ax to ax+Sa, and
subsidized non-profit entry, so that the fixed cost is reduced from Kn to Kn − Sk. Denote
mn(a) =
∫ x2(a)
x1(a)
λnx(1− Fnx (pˆx))Ndx+
∫ xn+(a)
x2(a)
λnxNdx
as the total number of non-profits across all locations at given a. The budget costs of the two
subsidies can now be expressed as:
B¯a = Nβn(x¯− x)Sa, B¯k = mn(a)Sk.
where Nβn(x¯−x) as before gives the total number of producers served by non-profits. Consider
therefore a small increase in the direct entry subsidy, starting from Sk = 0, the associated
impact
∂Pα
∂B¯k
= − β
mPnα
mn(a)Kn
whereas the marginal poverty impact of a small increase in B¯n has already been shown to be
∂Pα
∂B¯a
= − α
p¯N(x¯− x)P
n
α−1.
The relative effectiveness of the two reduces to the sign of the difference∣∣∣∣∂Pα∂B¯k
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣∂Pα∂B¯a
∣∣∣∣ (45)
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which is ambiguous in general. But to gain further intuitive insights, we note that Pnα ≤
Pnα−1(p¯ − c)/p¯ since p¯ − c is the largest possible poverty gap. Now, the inequality in (45)
reduces to a simple sufficient condition:
Proposition 5 The overall poverty impact of a Northern consumer subsidy on the price pre-
mium is greater than a direct subsidy on non-profit entry if
α ≥ β
mN(x¯− x)(p¯− c)
mn(a)Kn
.
Thus, devoting Northern consumer expenditure on the per unit export price premium has a
larger overall impact on poverty if the poverty gap βmN(x¯ − x)(p¯ − c) is sufficiently greater
than the cost of entry mn(a)Kn, and in addition, if poverty aversion α is sufficiently acute.
5 Conclusion
Let us return to the questions posed in the introduction. What does an equilibrium with
middlemen and non-profits look like? We have provided a full characterization of when only
middlemen will enter, when only non-profits will enter, and when both middlemen and non-
profits exist in equilibrium. In the last of these cases, locations closest to the hub, the most
advantaged, are served by middlemen; locations farthest away, the least advantaged, are served
by non-profits; but in between are locations which are served by both middlemen and non-
profits.
How precisely do the price mark up as well as the price pass-through, from market price
to producer price, differ in the equilibrium with middlemen and non-profits compared to the
equilibrium with only middlemen? The answer depends on the location. Close to the hub, where
only middlemen operate even after the entry of non-profits, nothing has been changed by entry
of non-profits, including mark up and pass through. Farthest from the hub, where only non-
profits operate, we show that both the average price of exports, as well as the responsiveness of
producer revenue to border price changes is now greater than if only middlemen had operated.
However, we show that in intermediate locations, where middlemen and non-profits co-exist,
the average producer price rises with the entry of non-profits, but the pass through remains
unchanged.
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What precisely is the impact of non-profits on poverty when the full round of market
repercussions, including entry and exit of middlemen and of non-profits, is taken into account?
We show that the introduction of non-profits pushes back the distance from the hub beyond
which all producers are poor. Essentially, non-profits serve the distant locations which are
not profitable for middlemen to serve. We also show that under certain conditions, which
capture whether the concern of the non-profit for poverty is strong enough, the introduction of
non-profits reduces national poverty.
Should a government interested in poverty reduction subsidize the entry of non-profits,
or should it perhaps subsidize the entry of middlemen? We address this question and add a
new possibility, that the government invests to improve the opportunity cost of selling to either
middlemen or non-profits (for example through improving local infrastructure). We provide
a detailed analytical characterization, and we get sharp results for specific cases. If the gov-
ernment’s objective is to minimize the poverty gap measure P1, we show the conditions under
which subsidizing the entry of middlemen is ranked lowest in terms of policy effectiveness. Sub-
sidizing the entry of non-profits and subsidizing the opportunity costs are equal in effectiveness,
but both are superior to subsidizing the entry of middlemen.
Finally, should wealthy consumers concerned about poverty pay a premium for fair trade
products, or would the same amount of money be better used to subsidize fair trade non-profits
directly? Our answer is intuitive – the price premium strategy is superior if the poverty gap is
sufficiently large relative to the cost of entry of the non-profit.
We believe that we have just begun the formal analysis of a range of markets that are
prevalent in developing countries; where middlemen earn profits that are considered “excessive”;
where remoteness exacerbates imperfect pass through; where non-profits come in to help the
poor in the face of what they see as exploitation by these middlemen; where governments
are faced with a policy problem of whether and how much to help non-profits or sanction
middlemen; and where rich country consumers are asked to pay a price premium for products
marketed by non-profits on behalf of poor producers, and to support the creation and entry
of such non-profits into these markets. The model structure we have developed allows us to
ask and answer a number of key questions in the debate on middlemen and non-profits. A rich
research agenda awaits.
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Appendix
Proof of inequality (30): From (28) and (29), expected producer price of exports with
non-profits only (regime III) can be expressed as:
Enpx = (1− γnx )(p∗ + ax− tx) + γnx c < p∗ − tx.
where γx ≡ λnxe−λ
n
x/(1− e−λnx ). In addition,
Epx = (1− γx)(p∗ − tx) + γxc < p∗ − tx
where γx ≡ λxe−λx/(1 − e−λx). The inequality in (30) follows directly from (28), where λnx is
shown to be greater than λx, and that γnx is decreasing in λ
n
x.
Proof of Proposition 2: We show that poverty Pnx,α (weakly) declines upon entry of non-
profits, in all regions shown in Figure 6 where at least some non-profits emerge in equilibrium.
Starting from Region IIn,nonepoorm,somepoor,
Pnx,α =
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp
=
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1
Hx(p)dp = Px,α.
For Region IIn,somepoorm,allpoor ,
Pnx,α =
α
p¯
∫ pˆx
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp+
α
p¯
∫ p¯
pˆx
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 Kn
p∗ + ax− tx− pdp
≤ α
p¯
∫ min{p¯,p+x }
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp = Px,α.
Similarly for Region IIIn,somepoor,
Pnx,α =
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 Kn
p∗ + ax− tx− pdp
≤ α
p¯
∫ min{p¯,p+x }
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ − tx− pdp = Px,α.
Finally, consider the region IIn,allpoorm,allpoor,
Pnx,α =
∫ pn+x
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α
dHnx (p)
Px,α =
∫ p+x
c
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α
dHx(p).
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Integrating by parts and taking difference,
Px,α − Pnx,α ≥
(
p¯− p+x
p¯
)α
(1−Hn(p+x ))−
∫ pn+x
p+x
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α
dHx(p) ≥ 0
since p+x ≤ pn+x .
Proof of (44): We consider here the case of a ∈ [t(Kn−K)/(p∗−c−K), t(Kn−K)/(p∗−p¯−K)].
The proofs involving the rest of the possibilities, with a > t(Kn−K)/(p∗−p¯−K), are analogous.
Overall poverty Pα is equal to the sum of
1
x¯− x
∫ xp
x
α
p¯
∫ p¯
c+sc
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ + sm − tx− pdpdx
associated with region Im,somepoor, plus
1
x¯− x
∫ x1(a)
xp
[
α
p¯
∫ p+x
c+sc
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ + sm − tx− pdp+
(
p¯− p+x
p¯
)α]
dx
associated with region Im,allpoor, plus
1
x¯− x
∫ x2(a)
x1(a)
[
α
p¯
∫ pˆx
c+sc
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 K
p∗ + sm − tx− pdp
+
α
p¯
∫ pn+x
pˆx
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 Kn
p∗ + ax+ sn − tx− pdp)
+
(
p¯− pn+x
p¯
)α]
dx
associated with region IIn,allpoorm,allpoor, plus
1
x¯− x
∫ xn+(a)
x2(a)
[
α
p¯
∫ pn+x
c+sc
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 Kn
p∗ + ax+ sn − tx− pdp+
(
p¯− pn+x
p¯
)α]
dx.
associated with region IIIn,allpoor.
Since B¯n = snNβn(x¯− x), and dB¯n = Nβn(x¯− x)dsn evaluated at sn = 0, we have
Nβn(x¯− x) ∂Pα
∂B¯n
= − 1
x¯− x
∫ x2(a)
x1(a)
[
α
p¯
∫ pn+x
pˆx
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 Kn
(p∗ + ax+ sn − tx− p)2dp
]
dx
− 1
x¯− x
∫ xn+(a)
x2(a)
[
α
p¯
∫ pn+x
c+sc
(
p¯− p
p¯
)α−1 Kn
(p∗ + ax+ sn − tx− p)2dp
]
dx.
Rearranging terms, and using (35), we have
∂Pα
∂B¯n
= − αP
n
α−1
p¯N(x¯− x) .
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